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PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent statutes and rules cited in this Reply have 
previously been set out in the Appellant's Brief. 
REPLY TO EMPIRE'S "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" 
Weyerhaeuser Mortgage Company (hereinafter "Weyerhaeuser") 
objects to the "Statement of the Case" as set forth by Empire 
Land Title, Inc., aka Empire Title Company (hereinafter "Em-
pire") , insofar as the "Statement of the Case" fails to provide 
proper cites to the record as is required by Rule 24(e) of the 
Utah Court of Appeals and by Rule 8(b) of the Content require-
ments set forth in this Court's Checklist for Briefs. This 
failure to cite facts is important, because Empire misstates 
several facts which could be relevant to this appeal. The fol-
lowing facts as set forth in Empire's brief are either incorrect 
or present erroneous implications: 
a. "At the time of sale and attempted assumption, and 
prior thereto, the property in question was occupied by a tenant 
of the Scotts named Papworth." There is no citation to the 
record for this alleged fact. Furthermore, the unstated impli-
cation of this asserted fact - that Mr. Wilson did not have 
control over Mr. Papworth - is in contravention of the evidence 
which established that the closing on the property took place 
on or about September 13, 1982, that Mr. Wilson's possession of 
the property was not interfered with through his discovery of 
the title problems approximately two and one-half years later 
and the property was not regained by Weyerhaeuser until a demand 
iii 
by Weyerhaeuser in May, 1985 (Transcript of Trial, pp. 20-24; 
plaintiff's exhibit 4; defendant's exhibit 14; Transcript of 
Trial, pp. 73 and 76). 
b. "Prior to the attempted assumption Wey€>rhaeuser had 
foreclosed and sold the property in question under the terms of 
its deed of trust with Scott." The erroneous implication con-
tained herein is that Weyerhaeuser was aware of this previous 
foreclosure. This is not, in fact, the case, as both parties 
were mistaken as to this fact (Transcript of Trial, pp. 20-24). 
c. "As a result of this foreclosure, Weyerhaeuser held 
all title to the property in question..." Again, there is no 
citation to the record, and this matter was not established. 
Mr. Wilson had possession of the property from approximately 
September 13, 1982 through May, 1985 and Mr. Wilson received a 
Warranty Deed from Sondra Scott dated September 10, 1982 (Tran-
script of Trial, pp. 20-24; Transcript of Trial, pp. 73 and 76; 
defendant's exhibit 5) (A true and correct copy of the Warranty 
Deed from Sondra Scott to Kelly Wilson, Exhibit 5 below, is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
d. "Some time after the attempted closing, Empire was 
contacted by attorneys for Wilson demanding substantial dam-
ages." Approximately 32 months elapsed between the time of the 
closing on September 13, 1982 and the settlement between the 
Wilsons, Empire and Empire's errors and omissions carrier, Shand 
Morahan & Company on April 16, 1985 (plaintiff's exhibit 5; 
Cross Examination Transcript, pp. 5 and 6). 
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POINT I 
TWO NEW POINTS RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME IN EMPIRE'S BRIEF SHOULD 
NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT. 
Empire's brief raises two issues for the first time on 
appeal, neither of which can or should be considered by this 
Court. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 491 (Utah 1986); Bundy v. 
Century Equip. Co. , Inc. . 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984); Trayner 
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984). This rule is true 
with respect to defenses as well as affirmative issues. Rosenlof 
v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 374 (Utah 1984); Banaerter v. Poulton, 
663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). 
First, Empire contends for the first time on appeal, in 
Point I and Point VI of Empire's brief, that it is entitled, 
of its own right, to its claims against Weyerhaeuser. This 
issue was not asserted at trial (at which time Empire was pur-
suing its claims as the assignee of Kelly Wilson) . See Memo-
randum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, R. 34-37 (In which 
Empire responded to Weyerhaeuserfs Motion to Dismiss by contend-
ing its standing as the real party in interest arose by virtue 
of an assignment from Kelly Wilson). Minute Entry, R. 39 (Court 
denies motion to dismiss, basing denial on assignment from Kelly 
Wilson). Likewise, the defenses raised in Points V and VI deal-
ing with the collateral source rule were never raised at trial 
and should not be considered by this Court. 
1 
Furthermore, even if the Court considers the issue respect-
ing Empire's own right to bring this action, the theory must 
fail. Empire makes reference to "its check" and asserts that 
the check was "drawn by it" to support its contention that, 
regardless of the source of the funds, it is entitled to their 
recovery. This argument, of course, is untenable, as it ignores 
the real party in interest requirements and the safeguards af-
forded the parties thereby. Empire in effect conceded this 
fact in its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (R. 
34-37). See Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be pro-
secuted in the name of the real party in interest") ; see also 
Lvnch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P. 2d 464 (Utah 1959) 
(Holding, in accordance with the "general rule", that the as-
signee was the real party in interest in pursuit of an action, 
to assure that available defenses could be assetrted against 
assignee); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Associates Transports, 
Inc., 512 P.2d 137, 140 (Okla. 1973) ("The real party in inter-
est is the party legally entitled to the proceeds of a claim in 
litigation.") (citations omitted). Evidence at trial established 
that the money tendered by Empire to Weyerhaeuser was from Kelly 
Wilson or another (Cross Examination Transcript, p. 14; Trial 
Transcript, p. 33). 
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POINT II 
EMPIRE'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
Empire attempts to assert in its brief that the "benefi-
ciary statement" is sufficient to form a written obligation be-
tween the parties, upon which a six-year statute of limitations 
can arise. The cases cited by Empire, however, clearly estab-
lish that the beneficiary statement did not form the writing 
required to bring about a six-year statute of limitation. 
Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 95 Utah 490, 80 P.2d 471 
(1938), and Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 28 Utah 2d 125, 499 
P.2d 273 (1972), do not support the extension of the statute of 
limitations to six years. Both cases clearly establish that in 
order for the obligation to be founded in writing it must "grow 
out of the written instruments". Bracklein at 476. The obliga-
tions which allegedly arose from the beneficiary statement re-
spected Wilson's assumption of the deed of trust (Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 3 and 9) . As Empire has pointed out in its brief, 
"The beneficiary statement, and the tendered check are the writ-
ten offer and acceptance of that offer between the parties. The 
offer and the check form the written agreement between Empire 
and Weyerhaeuser." (Respondent's Brief, p. 5). That alleged 
contract, however, for the assumption of the property, is not 
the basis for the relief sought by Empire. The relief sought 
does not "grow out of the written instrument". Bracklein at 
3 
476. Neither Empire nor Mr. Wilson seek to have the assumption 
agreement forced; rather, Empire seeks return of money paid at 
the closing of that matter.1 Empire's cause of action arises 
from an unjust enrichment theory or a theory of money paid by 
mistake. 
POINT III 
EMPIRE'S ASSIGNOR HAD AN OBLIGATION TO 
MAKE THE PAYMENTS ON THE TRUST DEED NOTE OR FOR 
THE REASONABLE RENTAL VALUE OF THE PROPERTY. 
Empire contends Kelly Wilson received nothing from the 
transaction, and thus Weyerhaeuser has no claim against him. 
This ignores, however, that Mr. Wilson took possession of the 
property as of approximately September 13, 1982, the date of 
the closing (plaintiff's exhibit 2; defendant's exhibit 5; 
Transcript of Trial, pp. 20-24), and that Weyerhaeuser took no 
action to evict either Mr. Wilson nor his tenants, Papworths, 
until May, 1985 (Transcript of Trial, pp. 73 and 76). It also 
ignores the offer, made by Empire and declined by Wilson, to 
pursue a quiet title action to legally affirm Wilson's ownership 
interest (Cross Examination Transcript, p. 24). Empire's brief 
attempts to bootstrap Mr. Wilson's inaction in collecting rent 
1Empire, upon discovery of the mistake, offered to bring a 
quiet title action to affirm and establish Kelly Wilson's own-
ership of the property. Kelly Wilson declined this offer and 
elected to obtain money damages rather than an affirmance of 
the contract (Cross Examination Transcript, p. 24). 
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into some sort of theory he had no interest in the property; 
this is simply not supported by the facts. The fact remains 
that Mr. Wilson had the right to the use and enjoyment of the 
property during all of this period of time, and that he could 
have, at any time, demanded rent from Mr. Papworth or could 
have demanded his ouster under the unlawful detainer provisions 
of Utah law. See generally Utah Code Ann. Chapter 78-36 (1987 
and Supp. 1989). 
Restatement of Contracts, Section 349, set forth at page 
16 of Appellant's Brief, clearly supports Empire's obligation 
to tender the benefits Mr. Wilson received under the property. 
It is not an acceptable defense to the requirement of restitu-
tion that Mr. Wilson elected not to pursue his rights. 
Empire's brief attempts to argue that, if the time of the 
discovery of the previous sale were moved to a couple of days 
after the attempted assumption, all would have been different. 
However, this same logic clearly establishes the inequity of 
Empire's position vis-a-vis the facts as they are, rather than 
as Empire wishes them to have been. Kelly Wilson and his tenant 
sat on the property for a period of two and one-half years (from 
September 13, 1982 through May, 1985), without forwarding any 
mortgage payments or the fair rental value of the property to 
Weyerhaeuser. The inequity of this situation is clear, and 
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precludes Empire from seeking its damages without providing a 
corresponding offset.2 
Empire's assertions that Kelly Wilson's performance was 
excused by virtue of Weyerhaeuserfs breach are likewise without 
merit. Wilson's failure to pay the mortgage payments continued 
for one and one-half years before the mistake was discovered 
and brought to the attention of Weyerhaeuser (Transcript of 
Trial, pp. 23-28; plaintiff's exhibit 4). Even assuming Wilson 
had a right to cease payments upon discovery of the mistake, he 
is still required to return to Weyerhaeuser the benefits he 
received. See Restatement of Contracts, Section 349. 
POINT IV 
EMPIRE FAILED TO JOIN THE REAL PARTIES 
IN INTEREST IN THIS ACTION, AND OTHER 
PARTIES NEEDED FOR JUST ADJUDICATION. 
Empire asserts, in connection with the failure to join 
real parties in interest and other persons necessary for just 
adjudication, that Weyerhaeuser could have itself sued these 
individuals. That contention ignores, however, that Empire 
2Empire argues that Weyerhaeuser's litigation against Mr. 
Papworth somehow excused its rights for an offset against Mr. 
Wilson. Weyerhaeuser contended at trial (Transcript of Trial, 
pp. 59-60) and still contends the reference to the other liti-
gation is irrelevant to this proceeding, but, should it be con-
sidered, points out that Weyerhaeuser's efforts against Mr. 
Papworth to collect any rent have not yet been successful, and 
further points out that even the institution of those proceed-
ings required a considerable expenditure . of time and effort. 
Had Empire or its assignor met its obligation, that time and 
effort would not have been necessary. 
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waited until beyond four years to bring its action and, as a 
result, many of the claims Weyerhaeuser may have had against 
others may have been barred by the applicable statutes of lim-
itation. See Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25 (Supp. 1989). 
Furthermore, it ignores the risks of inconsistent results when 
related claims are brought before different courts, and ignores 
those interests of "judicial economy and fairness to the parties 
in litigation" which are espoused in the case of Kemp v. Murray, 
680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984). Empire's failure to have joined 
these parties should bar the relief it seeks. 
Regarding Empire's contention that the contributions of 
Shand Morahan & Company are not of concern to Weyerhaeuser by 
virtue of the collateral source rule, Weyerhaeuser reasserts 
that this issue is being raised for the first time on appeal, 
and thus should not be considered by the Court. See Point I, 
generally. However, if the Court does deem it appropriate to 
consider the collateral source rule, it must realize the col-
lateral source rule provides only that "a wrongdoer is not en-
titled to have damages, for which he is liable, reduced by a 
proof that the plaintiff has received or will receive compen-
sation or indemnity for the loss from an independent collateral 
source." Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added). The collateral source rule applies 
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in instances where the claim giving rise to the obligation is 
one in tort, rather than an obligation of this sort. Id.3 
If the collateral source rule were applied as broadly as 
Empire seeks, the Court would have to abandon or significantly 
change its real party in interest and several related doctrines. 
Subrogation claims would, in all instances, expose parties to 
risks of multiple liability for the same obligation. Despite 
Empire's contention, a right to claim subrogation exists for 
Shand Morahan & Company with or without the inclusion of any 
express agreement therefor. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 
P. 2d 1197 (Utah 1980) (Holding subrogation to be lfa creature of 
equity", and affirming no need for contractual basis). 
POINT V 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES "EXPENDED 
IN COLLECTING" THE JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUS. 
Empire stipulated at trial that they were not pursuing 
attorneys1 fees, that there was no contractual basis for an 
award of attorneys1 fees; and that Weyerhaeuser's defenses were 
valid and did not justify any statutory award of attorneys1 
fees (Transcript of Trial, p. 99) . Now, however, Empire refuses 
to withdraw an award in the judgment of "attorneys1 fees ex-
pended in collection of the judgment." In support of its re-
3Alternatively, as is set forth in Point II, if Empire was 
pursuing a tort action against Weyerhaeuser, the statute of 
limitations had run, and the action should have been dismissed. 
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fusal, Empire cites only to Circuit Court Administrative Rules 
respecting default judgments. Weyerhaeuser submits that such 
Administrative Rules are intended to either deal only with cases 
where an award is otherwise justified, or the Rules should be 
stricken in light of the limitations repeatedly espoused by 
this Court respecting awarding of attorneys1 fees. Arnica Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
First and foremost, this Court can and should determine 
that there was no written contract between the parties, and thus 
that the applicable statutes of limitation bar Empire's claims. 
Second, the primary thrust of Empire's brief - that Empire had 
its own right to pursue the action, and that somehow the col-
lateral source rule allows Empire to collect monies it did not 
expend - flies against the face of clear justice. This Court 
can and should analyze the facts before it to determine that 
Empire brought its claims solely on the basis of an assignment 
from Kelly Wilson; that Kelly Wilson's claims were limited in 
that Kelly Wilson owed obligations to Weyerhaeuser which were 
not met; and that as a result no judgment should have been en-
tered against Weyerhaeuser. 
For these reasons, appellant requests that this Court re-
verse the Circuit Court's judgment below on any or all of the 
grounds argued, and that this Court remand this case to the 
Circuit Court for dismissal. 
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